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St. Rep. 564, 6i L.R.A. 277, 63 N.E. 607 (1902); Martin v. State,
70 Ohio St. 219, 71 N.E. 640 (1904). Nor is there a statute in Ohio
making gross negligence an unlawful act. Such a serious hiatus has
enabled persons to avoid criminal punishment though their acts were
highly dangerous to the public. Thus, in the case at bar, if the defendant
were guilty of gross negligence in killing a person on a private road or
driveway, or even on a public highway, he would not be liable unless
the particular act he did was illegal by statute. The Ohio legislature
is the only body that can remedy the aforestated hiatus, and there would
seem to be good reason for it so doing.
In the principal cast the evidence definitely showed that the driveway
was not only open to all the public but also maintained at public expense.
Therefore, in the light of the preceding discussion, the driveway, in the
case at bar, fits into the definition of a public road or highway. The
fact that the General Assembly had not as yet granted a special per-
mission, under Sec. 23 of the Ohio Gen. Code, for a road does not
make the way any the less a public road for the purpose of the man-
slaughter statute. The defendance was found guilty by the jury, of
drunken driving and driving without due regard for public safety, thus,
violating the Ohio Gen. Code Secs. 126o3-i and 12628-1. Therefore,
the Supreme Court, it seems, could reasonably have held the defendant
amenable to the second-degree manslaughter statute.
WILLIAM T. CREME
WHAT ARE GAMES OF CHANCE AND LOTTERIES?
The plaintiff corporation claims to have conceived and is now operat-
ing short range shooting galleries in which the player pays ten cents and
is allowed three shots with a regulation .22 calibre rifle and attempts to
obliterate one of four small red figure "5"s printed in each corner of a
small rectangular white card target. If a player succeeds in obliterating
one of the figures, he is awarded the "Jack Pot," a fund consisting of
five dollars put up by the operators and increased by ten cents every time
all four of the figures have been shot at. It is alleged that the defendants
are operating galleries similar in every way to the plaintiff's except for
the target, which in the defendants' galleries are diamond shaped and
marked with the letter "J"; and the name, "Jack Pot Galleries." The
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from carrying on this line of
business which is alleged to be in unfair trade competition with the plain-
tiff's galleries. The chief defense is a frank claim that the business of
both parties violates the gaming laws and is therefore illegal and that a
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court of equity should not interfere to protect it. The court dismissed
the petition, holding that these operations were in violation of Sections
13056 and 13059 of the Ohio Gen. Code, and being in violation of the
criminal law, it was not necessary to consider the claim as to "unfair
competition," for a court of equity cannot extend its powers to protect
such a business. '"5" Spot Short-Range Gun Clubs of America, Inc. v.
Rinehart et al., io N.E. (2d) 450 (Court of Appeals of Ohio, Lucas
County, 1937).
Section 13059 of the Ohio Gen. Code is broad in scope, saying,
"Whoever plays a game for money or other thing of value, or makes a
wager for money or other thing of value, shall be fined--" etc. Gen-
erally, gaming statutes may be divided into three classes. First, those
which are very general and cover almost every supposed case; second,
those which include every game at which money or property is won or
lost; third, those which expressly forbid betting on games or contests,
whether of chance or skill.
Although different in wording and in form, under all statutes cover-
ing this particular field of gambling, it becomes necessary to determine
the question as to what is a game of chance which will bring the case
within a given statute. The first requisite to hold a game illegal is that
of chance. In one of the earliest leading cases on this point, it is said,
"Universal acceptation of a 'game of chance' is such a game as is deter-
mined entirely or in part by lot or mere luck, and in which judgment,
practice, skill, or adroitness have honestly no office at all, or are thwarted
by chance." State v. Gupton, 3o N.C. 271 (1848); Commonwealth v,
Plissner, 4 N.E. (2d) 241 (Mass.); U. S. v. McKenna, 149 Fed. 252
(19o6). "The chief element of gambling is the chance or uncertainty
of the hazard," In re Cullivan, 114 App. Div. 654, 99 N.Y. Supp.
1097 (19o6). "The element of chance is the soul of the transaction,"
Ferguson v. State, 178 Ind. 568, 99 N.E. 8o6 (1912); Green v. Hart,
41 Fed. (2d) 855 (1930); State v. 4podaca, 32 N.Mex. 8o, 251
Pac. 389 (1926); Jenner v. State, 173 Ga. 86 (1931).
The test, however, is not whether the game contains elements of
chance or skill, but whether chance is the predominating element in the
determination of the game. Where the game itself is entirely one of
skill, but the element of chance is present in the determination of the
amount of the prize which the player will win, the game is held to be
within the prohibition of the gaming statutes. Speed v. Keys (Tex. Civ.
App.) 1Io S.W. (2d) 1245 (937). Thus we see that the element
of chance need not be present merely to defeat skill in the actual playing
of the game, but if it is present in the determination of the value of the
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prize won by the player, it is held to be of sufficient importance to make
the game illegal. "It is the character of the game, and not the skill or
want of skill of any given player which brings it into or excludes it from
the prohibition of the statute." Wortham v. State, 59 Miss. 179
(i881). Accord, People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 179 N.Y. 170, 71
N.E. 755; Blackwell v. State, 26 Ala. App. 398, 162 So. 312 (1935);
D'Oro v. Startup Candy Co., 71 Utah 410 (1928), annotated in 6o
A.L.R. 338; State v. Gaughan, 55 W.Va. 692, 78 S.E. 21o (1904).
"We believe that it is not essential to gambling that one should
have a chance to lose, but that the player has a chance and lure to get
something for nothing." Snyder v. Alliance, 34 O.L. Rep. 543, 41
Ohio App. 48, 179 N.E. 426 (93i). In accord with this doctrine
are cases in which it is held that any added amusement which may be
procured by chance, in addition to a known consideration for the money
expended by the player, is sufficient to bring the cases within the prohi-
bition of the statutes. In these cases, the problem of what is a thing
of value is integrated with the problem of the predomination of chance
over skill. This problem is present in cases in which the device com-
plained of is a machine in which the customer places a coin and receives
a package of mints, gum, or some other confection, and in addition may
receive disks or "slugs" with which to replay the machine. However,
when operating the machine with these disks or "slugs," the player does
not receive merchandise, but merely receives some mild form of amuse-
ment such as humorous sayings or horoscopes or pretended fortunes,
presented by a system of revolving disks. Here we have the element
of chance, but it is necessary to find the element of money or "other
thing of value," to outlaw the device under gaming statutes. There
appears a definite split of authority on this question, some courts holding
that this added amusement, being determined by chance, and not dis-
tributed to each customer in the same quantity, is something of sufficient
value as to brand these devices with the stamp of disapproval under
gaming statutes. "The method of affording that amusement and the
quantity thereof is determined by chance, and, while appeal thereby
made to gamble may not be so strong as where the stakes are greater,
nevertheless it does encourage such a spirit." Gaither v. Gate, 156 Md.
254, 144 At. 239 (1928). Ferguson v. State, 178 Ind. 568, 99 N.E.
8o6 (1912); State ex rel. Manchester v. Marvin, et al, 211 Iowa 462,
233 N. . 486 (193o); Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585,
(1927) ; Snyder v. lliance, supra: "A thing of value to be the subject
of gaming, may be anything affording the necessity lure to indulge the
gambling instinct. Any excitement which would impel the player to
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stake money on a chance of winning, would produce consequences at
which the enactment is aimed." Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627
(1927), annotated in 81 A.L.R. 173. Where the added amusement
was a pretended horoscope or fortune, Jenner v. State, 173 Ga. 86
(93); Rankin v. Mills Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S.W. (2d)
161 (I93O); State v. Mint Vending Machine Co., 85 N.H. 22, 154
At. 224 (93i); Commonwealth v. McClintock, 257 Mass. 431, 154
N.E. 264 (1926).
In direct dissent to this view is substantial authority to the effect that
amusement is not a thing of value to bring the game within the prohi-
bition of the gaming statutes. Under a Connecticut statute almost
identical in wording with the Ohio statute, saying "any person who shall
play at any game-for any valuable thing, shall be fined . ' -:," the
court in the case of Mills Novelty Go. v. Farrell, 64 Fed. (2d) 476,
3 Fed. Supp. 555 (I933), held that such humorous inscriptions are not
things of value, and thus the element of chance is not involved with
Cca gain," and the game is not illegal. This was held to be a lawful
advertising device and not gaming. The same machine manufactured
by the same company was also held not to violate the gaming laws in
People v. Jennings, 257 N. Y. 196, 177 N.E. 419 (1931); Overby v.
Oklahoma City, 46 Okla. Crim. Rep. 42, 287 Pac. 796 (1930);
Green v. Hart, 41 Fed. (2d) 855 (1930); Jenner v. State, supra;
In re Cullivan, 114 App. Div. 654, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1097 (i9o6).
In the principal case, the court cites the case of Stevens v. The
Times-Star Co., 72 Ohio St. 112, 73 N.E. 1058 (1905), which in-
volves a lottery. In that case it is held that the element of chance is not
incompatible with the element of calculation or even certainty. It seems
obvious that many devices may be held to be violations of the lottery laws
as well as the gaming laws, and the reason for the differentiation may be-
come lost in the numerous cases. In State v. Schwemler, 154 Or. 533,
6o Pac. (2d) 938 (1936), the court says: "The reason for the distinc-
tion between a lottery and ordinary forms of gaming is the demoralizing
effect of a lottery upon people generally throughout the state. The
lottery infests the whole community, reaches every class; while gambling
is confined to a few persons and places". The authorities are in complete
accord that the elements of prize, chance, and consideration are all
necessary to bring a scheme within the prohibition of the lottery statutes.
Society Theatre v. Seattle, n8 Wash. 258, 203 Pac. 21 (1922);
State v. Fox Kansas Theatre Co., 144 Kan. 687, 62 Pac. (2d) 929
(1936), annotated in 1O9 A.L.R. 709. In most cases in which a lottery
is involved it is but a matter of a moment to discover the elements of
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prize and chance, but much conflict is noted in the matter of decisions
as to what constitutes the necessary consideration. This conflict of ju-
dicial interpretation is crystallized in the "Bank Night" cases which
have recently reached courts of last resort. In discussing these cases it
must be noted that there are two general types of "Bank Night"
schemes. First, those in which registration and actual receipt of the
award may be had without cost to the participants; Second, those in
which it is necessary to pay admission to register, and/or admission at
the times when the awards are made. Under both procedures, the
registration numbers are placed in a receptacle from which a number
and name are drawn at each of the periodical drawings in the theatre.
The winner must claim the prize within an alloted time, usually from
one to three minutes. If the prize is not claimed within that time, the
amount of that award is added to the prize for the next drawing. The
prize money is contributed by the operators of the scheme.
In the case of the payment of an admission fee as a condition of
participation in the drawings, either as a condition precedent to registra-
tion or to be present at the drawing or both, the courts find no difficulty
in finding the necessary consideration to determine that the scheme is a
lottery, and violates the criminal law. This is done by a finding that the
admission price is paid for the privilege of attending a movie program
and also for the chance to win the award. Davenport v. City of Ottawa,
54 Kan. 711, 39 Pac. 708 (1895); People v. Miller, 271 N. Y. 44,
2 N.E. (2d) 38 (936); Horner v. United States, 147 U.S. 449, 13
Sup. Ct. 409, 37 L. Ed. 237 (1893); where no admission price is
necessary to win an award, the decisions are in sharp conflict. Some
courts hold that under this plan there is no element of consideration
present to bring the "Bank Night" scheme within the prohibition of the
lottery provisions. The scheme is one merely to make gifts of money,
and there is no criminal liability for such an enterprise. State v. Eames,
87 N.H. 477; 183 Atl. 590, 103 A.L.R. 866 (1936); State v.
Hundlng, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N.W. 6o8 (1936); Griffith Amuse-
ment Co. v. Morgan, 98 S.W. (2d) 844 (1936); People v. Shafer,
273 N.Y. 475, 6 N.E. (2d) 410 (1936).
That the element of consideration need not be a pecuniary one flow-
ing from the patron to the operator of the scheme, but that it neverthe-
less may be a lottery on the finding of other consideration, is the con-
flicting view held by many courts. Where the consideration was held to
be the attraction of patrons to the theatre, who would otherwise not
attend, the "Bank Night" scheme was held to be a lottery, and in viola-
tion of the lottery laws. Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Co., 293
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N.Y. Supp. 745, 162 Misc. (N.Y.) 491 (i937). Where those patrons
who did pay to attend the theatre on the day of the drawing, as well as
those who did not attend, had a chance to win the award, the admission
price paid by some of the potential winners is held to be sufficient con-
sideration to brand the plan as a lottery. Jorman v. State, 54 Ga. A.
738, i88 S.E. 925 (1936); City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co.,
100 S.W. (2d) 695 (936); Commonwealth v. Wall, 3 N.E. (2d)
28 (1936) ; Central States Theatre Corp. v. Colonial Theatrical Enter-
prises, 276 Mich. 127, 267 N.W. 602 (936).
Thus, to outlaw a device, scheme, or game under the gaming stat-
utes, it is necessary to find the element of chance thwarting the element
of skill involved, or the chance appearing in the amount of the prize the
player way win. The game must be played for money or other valuable
thing, which may include property, or merely amusement or entertain-
ment, in addition to the goods which the patron professes to buy. To
hold a scheme illegal as a lottery it is necessary to find the elements of
chance, prize, and consideration. The consideration need not be a pe-
cuniary one flowing from the patron directly to the operator of the lot-
tery, but may be found to be any benefit to the operator, though it comes
to him from some other source, and not directly from the patron.
ARTHUR W. MEIFERT
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE -WIRE
TAPPING
The defendants were charged with smuggling alcohol, possessing
and concealing smuggled alcohol, and conspiracy to smuggle and conceal
alcohol. Much of the evidence was secured by the wire tapping activities
of Federal agents. The defendants were convicted and the result
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. U. S. v. Nardone, 90 Fed.
(2d) 630; certiorari granted, 58 S. Ct. 27, 82 L. Ed. Adv. Op. II
(1937). Section 6o5 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6o5, 48 Stat. 1103 (June 19, 1934), provides that
cno person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purpose, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person." On the basis of this section the United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of conviction, Justices Sutherland and McRey-
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